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Exports  are a mainstay of United States agriculture.  Long-term
disposal of agricultural surpluses at subsidy in the face of increasing
subsidization by other surplus producing regions of the world has built a
strong constituency for such subsidy.  At the same time that this
constituency grew in agriculture, the U.S. maritime shipping fleet sought
to mandate that a portion of certain U.S. government cargo shipments be
handled exclusively by U.S. carriers.  This created a separate and
competing constituency for protection.
This  report examines a policy problem representative of subsidy
programs that develop strong constituencies over time:  two  such subsidies
may not only be inconsistent, but in open political conflict.  We will
describe the effect of conflicting subsidies on two industries  involved in
international trade, and the effects representative of the damages  that
"competition for protection",  rather than competition for markets, has
brought to the Port of Duluth-Superior.
The story of the conflict generated by these subsidy programs is
briefly as follows.  The Food for Peace Program (PL-480) was  initiated in
1954.  It mandated donation or sale of surplus stocks of U.S. grain as aid
and for market development.  Soon afterwards, the Cargo Preference Act of
1954 was passed.  It mandated that 50 percent of "U.S. government impelled"
cargoes, including Food for Peace shipments, were to be transported on U.S.
flag vessels.  Over the next 30 years, this was the norm.
In 1982,  the Reagan administration introduced a subsidy program to
increase the competitiveness of U.S.  agricultural exports in the face of a
strong dollar and subsidies by competing exporting nations.  Maritime
interests filed suit when the administration did not apply cargo preference
irequirements to this  "blended credit" program.  On February 21,  1985, Judge
June L. Green of the District Court of the District of Columbia ruled on
the suit Transportation Institute v. Dole. et al. that blended credit and
other similar programs, including some to which cargo preference had never
before been applied, were subject to cargo preference regulations.  Five
days after the ruling, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
suspended the blended credit program, since the ruling rendered it
uncompetitive.
The day following the Transportation Institute ruling, the Reagan
administration's proposal for farm legislation was  introduced.  The  issue
of cargo preference would become an important part of the wrangling over
the 1985 Farm Bill.  Eventually a compromise was reached that was
acceptable to both agrarian and maritime interests, where commercial
programs like blended credit would be exempted from cargo preference
requirements in return for a three-year phased increase from 50  to 75
percent in cargo preference requirements for PL-480 concessional cargoes.
An annual guarantee of about 250,000 tons of PL-480 cargo to Great Lakes
ports through 1989 and a change in the accounting year were added to  the
compromise to placate Great Lakes  interests.
Great Lakes ports were hurt by this compromise.  With fewer U.S. flag
vessels capable of carrying PL-480 cargo visiting the Lakes, there  is a
lesser chance that the required flag vessels will be available, further
magnifying the  injury.  This  injury also increased as the regional economy
became more dependent on nontraditional port activities such as PL-480.
This report will first explain the legislative history and
administrative components of the PL-480 and Cargo Preference laws;  second,
examine the controversy over USDA blended credit programs and cargo
iipreference;  and third, describe the  events leading to the compromise on
cargo preference and the Great Lakes.  Since the compromise on cargo
preference was reached as part of the bargaining over the Food Security Act
of 1985  (1985 Farm Bill),  the evolution of that legislation as it related
to cargo preference is given special emphasis.  The politics and interest
groups of cargo preference are considered, together with the legislative
process in the Congress.  Fourth, the economic  injury inflicted by these
laws on the Port of Duluth-Superior and other Great Lakes ports are
examined.  Finally, it  is suggested that to  reduce the  injury to Great
Lakes ports the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 be repealed and replaced by a
direct subsidy program administered by the Maritime Administration.
iiiCARGO PREFERENCE LEGISLATION, AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS, AND THE FUTURE OF
THE DULUTH-SUPERIOR ECONOMY:  A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
We come up to a point of confrontation of two valid public
policy positions.  One is maintaining a strong U.S. maritime
fleet.  The other is maintaining a strong U.S. agricultural
sector.  If the two are not going to work together, then both are
going to be harmed.
James L. Oberstar, M.C.
INTRODUCTION
Exports are a mainstay of United State agriculture.  Beginning in the
1950s,  the U.S. sought to dispose of its agricultural surpluses at  subsidy,
and to build long-term export markets in the process.  As international
competition for markets grew, U.S. commodities  faced increasing
subsidization by other  surplus-producing regions of the world, notably the
European Community  (EC).  It is now widely held that in the face of export
subsidy programs by competitors, American farm interests must retain
subsidies  to compete on an even footing.  There  is  a strong constituency
for such subsidies.
At the same time this demand for subsidy was unfolding  in agriculture,
another American industry was demanding a different type of protection.
The U.S. maritime shipping fleet, aging and less  competitive than in the
past, sought to  assure itself a market by mandating that a portion of
certain U.S. government cargo shipments be handled exclusively by U.S.
carriers.  It too created a strong constituency for such protection.
This  report examines a policy problem representative of subsidy
programs  that develop strong constituencies over time:  two such subsidies
may not only be  inconsistent, but  in open political conflict.  In thisreport we will describe the effects of conflicting subsidies on two
industries involved in international trade, and the effects  of the conflict
generated by those subsidies on the Port of Duluth-Superior,  caught in the
crossfire of these  interests.  These effects are representative of the
damages that  "competition for protection,"  rather than for markets, can
bring.
Competition among interest groups rarely involves pure conflict.
There are almost always elements of both conflict and commonality
(Schelling, 83,  1960).  This  is  the base upon which bargaining and,
ultimately, compromise are built.  The case of "competition for protection"
or "competition for subsidy" that we will examine is  typical of such
bargaining situations.  In this  case, both maritime and agrarian interests
wished to increase their share of the PL-480 program subsidy.  As we shall
show, a feasible political solution was reached, but at a cost  to  overall
social efficiency.  The relative costs of political compromise will be  our
central  focus,  since these costs have not been evenly spread.  Particular
groups, notably Great Lakes ports, have borne an unusually large proportion
of the cost.
While economic  theory suggests free markets lead to efficient  (low
cost) allocations, many such allocations are socially undesirable.  Good
policy achieves social goals with minimal losses in efficiency.  Bad policy
may achieve  its goals, but only at a cost of greater inefficiency.
Cargo preference is bad policy.  It has created perverse incentives,
with results that are actually the opposite of those  intended.  Instead of
providing the impetus  for ship owners to  invest in new, efficient, and safe
merchant vessels, it has permitted them in many cases  to use inadequate
2vessels to haul what in essence is  captive cargo.  This has actually
promoted the decay of the American fleet, which now relies on subsidy to
stay afloat.  One consideration in examining the cargo preference program
and PL-480 is whether alternative policies could reduce  the distortions of
market signals and thus  induce a desired response  from ship owners.
The story of the conflict generated by these subsidies is briefly as
follows.  The Food for Peace program  (PL-480) was initiated with the
passage of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 on
July 10,  1954.  It mandated the donation or sale of surplus  stocks of U.S.
grain as aid and for market development.  Within six weeks,  on August 25,
1954, the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 was passed.  It mandated that 50
percent of "U.S. government impelled"  cargoes were to be transported on
U.S. flag vessels for the purpose of maintaining a strong merchant marine
capable of supporting U.S. ocean-borne commerce and acting as an auxiliary
to the military if needed.  Fifty percent of Food for Peace cargoes was to
be shipped on U.S. flag vessels.  Over the next 30  years, this was the norm.
In 1982, the Reagan administration introduced a subsidy program to
increase the competitiveness of U.S. agricultural exports  in the face of  a
strong dollar and subsidies by competing exporting nations.  Maritime
interests filed suit when the Administration did not apply cargo preference
requirements  to this  "blended credit" program.  On February 21,  1985, Judge
June L. Green of the District Count of the District of Columbia ruled on
the suit Transportation Institute v. Dole. et al.  that blended credit and
other similar programs, including some to which cargo preference had never
before been applied, were subject to  cargo preference regulations.  Five
days after the ruling, on February 26,  1985,  the United States Department
3of Agriculture  (USDA) suspended some $536 million of blended credit sales.
The day after the Transportation Institute ruling, on February 22,
1985,  Senator Jesse Helms introduced the Reagan administration's proposal
for farm legislation.  While not immediately apparent, the issue of cargo
preference would become an important part of the wrangling over  the 1985
Farm Bill.  Eventually a compromise was reached that was acceptable to both
agrarian and maritime  interests.  Commercial programs like  the blended
credit program would be exempted from cargo preference requirements in
return for a three-year phased increase from 50  percent to 75 percent in
cargo preference requirements for PL-480 cargoes.  Also  included was a
provision to  guarantee about 250,000 tons  of PL-480 cargo annually to Great
Lakes ports through 1989,  and a change in the accounting year from calendar
year to April 1 to March 31.
This compromise on cargo preference hurt Great Lakes ports, which are
a focus of this report.  Since there are few U.S. flag vessels capable of
carrying PL-480 type cargo that visit the Lakes,  there  is  a lesser chance
that the required flag vessels will be available.  With greater U.S.  flag
participation required, the injury was magnified.  This  injury also
increased as  the regional economy became more dependent on nontraditional
port activities.  In the past taconite and coal were important cargoes.  As
ore quality declined and coal became less expensive elsewhere, PL-480 took
on an even more important role in ports such as Duluth-Superior.  Its
longshoremen are dependent on cargo preference cargoes for as much as half
of their aggregate hours of employment on the docks  (United States
Congress, Hearings, 16  July 1985,  12).
This report will first seek to  explain the  legislative history and
4administrative components of the PL-480 and Cargo Preference laws.  Second,
the controversy over USDA blended credit programs and cargo preference will
be examined.  Third, the events  leading to  the compromise on cargo
preference and the Great Lakes will be described.  Since the compromise on
cargo preference was reached as part of the bargaining over the Food
Security Act of 1985  (1985 Farm Bill),  the evolution of that legislation as
it related to cargo preference will be given special emphasis.  The
politics and interest groups of cargo preference will be considered,
together with the legislative process in the Congress.  Fourth, the
economic effects  of these laws on the Port of Duluth-Superior and other
Great Lakes ports will be examined.  Finally, some suggestions  to  improve
the conditions  in the Twin Ports brought about by this compromise will be
made, and some lessons will be drawn for future trade policies.
I.
A BRIEF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CARGO PREFERENCE AND FOOD FOR PEACE
The cargo preference and Food for Peace programs, enacted within six
weeks of one another during the 83rd Congress, have been intimately linked
for over thirty years.  One, cargo preference, explicitly subsidizes
maritime interests, while the other, Food for Peace, subsidizes farmers
and farm interests.  Food for Peace cargoes have become a major constituent
of nonmilitary preference cargo.  This section provides the basic
background required to understand the cargo preference and PL-480 programs.
Brief legislative histories of each program are presented to give  an
understanding of Congressional intent.  The examination of cargo preference
also  includes a review of U.S. maritime policy and a general discussion of
government aid to maritime interests.
5The Food for Peace Program:  PL-4801
Public Law 480 was adopted on July 10,  1954  in response to post-World
War II  changes  in the domestic and international agricultural economies.
Its purpose was to dispose of surplus production, maintain farm income
levels, and to regain lost export markets.  During the  floor debates in
1953 and 1954, Senator Milton R. Young also noted that:
We are  in the position of a nation with agricultural
surpluses, when many other nations are starving.  When we have
such surpluses, we have adverse  farm prices, and when we have
adverse farm prices,  there develops a national economic problem.
This bill proposes for the first time, I think, a very feasible
and sound method of trying to make our agricultural surpluses
available to other nations of the world who are needy and in
want of these supplies  (Congressional Record, v. 99, pt. 8, July
23,  1953:  10079).
PL-480 thus made a virtue out of necessary efforts  to dispose of
unwanted agricultural surpluses.  The  three main thrusts of the legislation
were:  (1) to reduce the cost of government storage of surplus grain stocks
acquired through the price support system;  (2) to  support farmer incomes;
and (3) to use  surplus U.S. agricultural commodities  to  feed hungry nations
and develop overseas markets.  The primary orientation of the act was
domestic:  purposes  (1) and (2) tended to dominate  (3).
In 1966,  the Food for Peace Act of 1966 "shifted the purpose of the
...program from surplus disposal to planned production for export to meet
world needs."  (Epstein, 1986,  19).  This amendment to  the basic PL-480
legislation transformed it into a food aid program, which it remains today.
1This  section draws  extensively on a comprehensive report on PL-480
prepared by Susan Epstein of the Congressional Research Service.  Susan
Epstein,  Food for Peace. 1954-1986:  Major Changes  in Legislation,  CRS
Report for Congress,  87-409  ENR, April 30,  1985.
6The Act, as amended, consists of four titles.  According to Epstein:
Under title I, the U.S. government is  authorized to  provide
concessional, long-term financing for the commercial sale of U.S.
agricultural commodities to friendly nations.  Ten percent of the
value of this title may be repaid in foreign inconvertible
currencies.  Loans are made available at a minimum interest rate
of two percent during the grace period, two to ten years, and
three percent thereafter, and are  repayable within ten to 40
years.  Initial payment of at  least five percent of the purchase
price  is required.  Most agreements  include a provision that up
to ten percent of the purchase price be repaid on demand in local
currency.  Those funds are  then used by the United States for  its
expenses in the host country.
Title II authorizes  the donation of U.S. agricultural
commodities to nations for the purpose of alleviating famine or
providing disaster relief, combating malnutrition, and
encouraging economic and community development.  Commodities are
purchased by the Federal Government and donated under government-
to-government agreements and through the U.S. World Food Program
and nonprofit voluntary relief agencies.  Monetization (or the
sale of donated commodities) within the recipient country by the
commodity distributor (i.e.,  PVOs, WFP, or a U.S. agency) is
allowed if certain criteria regarding use of acquired funds are
met.
Title III,  along with the barter provisions, authorizes the
Food for Development Program, under which eligible nations may
have Title I loans  forgiven if the local currency generated from
Title I program commodity sales  is used to finance mutually
satisfactory development projects.
Title IV authorizes  the farmer-to-farmer program.  This
program was first implemented as a one year pilot program in 1985
(Epstein,  1986, 52-53).2
In 1985, in the course of the passage of the farm bill and other
legislation, several more amendments were made to the Food for Peace
program in keeping with administration policy to expand agricultural
exports.  Title I was amended to allow sales  for local currencies.  The
2Titles  I and III  are administered by USDA while Title I is  under
USAID jurisdiction.  In many statistical abstracts,  such as  those prepared
by the Maritime Administration of the Department of Transportation, Titles
I and III  are aggregated.  Title  IV, the Farmer-to-Farmer program, was
instituted in 1966  as part of the Food for Peace Act of 1966.  It was to
allow "an exchange of individuals from the U.S. agricultural community to
teach farmers in developing countries about improved farming methods"
(Epstein,  1986,  19-20).
7Title II program minimum tonnage requirement for donations was  increased
from 1.7  to  1.9 million metric tons, with a further requirement that at
least 1.425 million metric tons be distributed through private voluntary
organizations (PVOs), cooperatives, and the World Food Program.  Another
provision increased the nonemergency requirement for bagged, processed, or
fortified commodities to  75  percent.
The United States Maritime Policy Mandate
The purpose of the United States maritime policy as stated in the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, and little changed from that  time,  is  that:
It  is necessary for the national defense and development of
its  foreign and domestic commerce that  the United States  shall
have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic
water-borne commerce and a substantial portion of the water-borne
export and import foreign commerce of the United States  and to
provide shipping service essential for maintaining  the flow of
such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all  times,  (b)
capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of
war or national emergency,  (c)  owned and operated under the
United States flag by citizens of the United States  insofar as
may be practicable, (d)  composed of the best equipped, safest,
and most suitable  types of vessels, constructed in the United
States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel,
and (e) supplemented by efficient facilities for shipbuilding and
ship repair.  It is hereby declared to be  the policy of the
United States  to foster the development and encourage  the
maintenance of such a merchant marine (Public Law No.  835,  74th
Congress,  section 101, 49  Stat. 1989 (Merchant Marine Act of
1936, Section 101)).
Put simply, U.S. merchant maritime policy should be first concerned
with commercial and second with military aspects:  a fleet to show the
flag abroad that is built at home.  Shipbuilding, like auto manufacturing,
is an industry of such economic and strategic importance that governments
have regularly ignored high domestic costs  to assure home-based industrial
capacity.
8U.S. maritime policy is  implemented by providing both nonfiscal and
fiscal aid to ship owners as opposed to shipping.  Jantscher broadly
defines nonfiscal aid as:
...assistance [that]  is  rendered through the exercise of a
government's regulatory powers.  No payments flow between
government and the private sector, either of money or  in
kind....  (Jantscher, 1975, 11).
and fiscal aid as:
...[assistance that is]  administered through an exercise of
the government's taxing or spending powers and therefore usually
involv[ing] money flows between the public and private sectors.
Occasionally the payments  are made for a consideration, ...but
for the most part these aids take the form of unrequited
payments:  taxes if paid from the private to the public sector,
subsidies if paid in the opposite direction (Jantscher, 1975,
13).
Practically, there are three methods of aid--cabotage,  preference, and
subsidy.  Cabotage, a nonfiscal aid, reserves domestic, or "coastal,"
trade  for domestic shipping.  Subsidy, a fiscal aid, provides payments to
ship owners.  Cargo preference reserves a certain amount of cargo for
domestic vessels in international trade.  Its nature is  blurred since it
has  features of both fiscal and nonfiscal aid.  Jantscher explains  that:
...cargo preference laws...have both fiscal and non-fiscal
characteristics.  If they only require that public authorities
should patronize domestic flag vessels and refrain from using
foreign flag carriers, they are fiscal aids, because the benefits
are given through an exercise of the government's spending
powers.  If they only require that certain classes of private
shippers should patronize domestic carriers, they constitute a
form of non-fiscal assistance.  Most preference laws, however,
have both requirements  (Jantscher, 1975, 13).
Thus cargo preference is  a hybrid policy measure with features of both
cabotage and subsidy.
The nonfiscal aspect of cargo preference--the requirement that
certain classes  of private  shippers patronize domestic carriers--sends
9signals that affect the market decisions not only of carriers, but also of
shippers, goods sellers, and other in the marketing chain, to a much
greater degree than would purely fiscal aid.  Purely fiscal aid, in the
form of guaranteed government cargoes, or even monetary grants,
significantly affect only the government and the carriers, and thus lessens
economic distortions and inefficiencies.
Legislative Basis  for Cargo Preference
Three major pieces of legislation have shaped cargo preference policy
in the United States.  They are  the Military Transportation Act of 1904,
Public Resolution 17 of March 1934, and the Cargo Preference Act of 1954.
The first, the Military Transportation Act of 1904  (Act of April 28,  1904,
33  Stat. 518,  10 U.S.C. 1970 edition, sec 2631) required that all ocean
borne supplies for the U.S. armed forces be carried on U.S. registered or
by U.S. government-owned vessels.  Exceptions were allowed only when
freight rates charged by U.S. vessels were "excessive  or otherwise
unreasonable"  (Jantscher, 1975,  78).  The Department of Defense  still makes
it a point of policy to ship all defense cargoes on U.S. flag vessels.
The second major piece of legislation affecting cargo preference is
Public Resolution 17 of March 1934 (Joint Resolution of March 26,  1934, 48
Stat. 500 15 USC 1970 edition, sec. 616  (a)).  According to Lawrence, when
... it was discovered in 1934 that certain foreign buyers
were routing purchases financed by U.S.  government loans via
foreign flag  [vessels],  the Congress passed a resolution
expressing its intent that all future  government financed exports
be routed exclusively via U.S.  flag vessels  (Lawrence,  1966,
66).
According to Lawrence, the resolution "applies  specifically to  export
shipments financed in whole or part by  'any loans made by...  any...
10instrumentality of the government'"  (Lawrence,  1966,  66n).  Jantscher
further explains that:
soon after this resolution was approved, a question arose
whether it laid down an absolute requirement that products that
come within its scope must in all cases be carried in U.S.
bottoms.  The attorney general expressed the opinion that
Congress did not intend to make the resolution mandatory;  that
Congress  intended only "to  lay down a rule of guidance" to be
followed whenever it was feasible to do so  (Official Opinions of
the Attorneys General of the United States, vol. 37  [1936],  546,
cited in Jantscher, 1975, 78-79, 78n).
This resolution, while not imposing a strict legal requirement, was
the "sense of Congress,"  and effectively demanded that half of government
financed exports to be shipped on U.S. flag carriers. 3 The intent of the
resolution was subsequently incorporated into and affirmed by the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936,  the definitive  statement of U.S. maritime policy, which
directed government maritime authorities "to  cooperate with ship owners  in
devising means to induce importers and exporters to use U.S.  flag vessels
and to work with other government agencies to secure preference for
American ships"  (Lawrence, 1975,  66,  66n).
The third major piece of legislation, and the most important to  this
study, is  the Cargo Preference Act of 1954  (Act of August 25,  1954,  68
Stat. 832), which added a new subsection 901  (b) to  the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936  (46 USC 1970 edition, sec.  1241  (b)).  The Cargo Preference Act
of 1954 was enacted as an amendment to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.  It
states in part that:
30nly cargoes financed by the Export-Import Bank of the United States
are affected by this measure.  According to Jantscher, shortly after World
War II,  the Maritime Administration granted waivers so  that up to 50
percent of cargoes bound for economically damaged, rebuilding nations could
be carried on bottoms of that nation  (Jantscher, 1975,  78-79,  79n).
11Whenever the United States shall procure, contract for, or
otherwise obtain for its  own account, or shall furnish to or for
the account of any foreign nation without provision for
reimbursement, any equipment, materials, or commodities, within
or without the United States, or shall advance funds or credits
or guarantee the convertibility of foreign currencies  in
connection with the furnishing of such equipment, materials, or
commodities, the appropriate agency or agencies shall take such
steps as may be necessary and practicable to  assure that at least
50 percentum of the gross tonnage of such equipment, materials,
or commodities  (computed separately for dry bulk carriers, dry
cargo liners, and tankers), which may be transported on ocean
vessels shall be transported on privately owned United
States-flag commercial vessels, to the extent such vessels are
available at fair and reasonable rates for United States-flag
commercial vessels,  in such manner as will insure a fair and
reasonable participation of United States-flag commercial vessels
in such cargoes by geographic areas:  Provided that the
provisions of this subsection may be waived whenever the Congress
by concurrent resolution or otherwise, or the President of the
United States or the Secretary of Defense declares that an
emergency exists justifying a temporary waiver of the provisions
of  [this section]  and so  notifies the appropriate agency or
agencies:  And further provided, that the provisions of this
section shall not apply to cargoes carried in the vessels  of the
Panama Canal Company.  Nothing herein shall repeal or otherwise
modify the provision of Public Resolution Numbered 17,
Seventy-third Congress  (48 Stat.,  500),  as amended.  For purposes
of this section, the term "privately owned United States-flag
commercial vessels"  shall not be deemed to  include any vessel
which,subsequent  to the date of enactment of this amendment,
shall have been either (a) built outside the United States,  (b)
rebuilt outside the United States,  or  (c) documented under any
foreign registry, until such vessel shall have been documented
under the laws of the United States for a period of three
years:....  (PL 83-664,  68  Stat. 832, August 26,  1954).
PL 83-664 was proposed in response  to the Eisenhower administration's
urging that  "all aids  to ensure a merchant marine adequate  to  defense
requirements be provided by direct means" (Lawrence,  1966,  169).4 It
4Senator John Marshall Butler  (R-MD) originally proposed that all
government cargoes,  including all military shipments, be shipped by
privately owned U.S. bottoms.  A compromise was reached to  accommodate
several  interests.  Preferences were to apply only to half of the
government's nonmilitary shipments because this was thought to be more
consistent with the "substantial portion" language of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936.  Another compromise was to  include  the "fair and reasonable
rates  for U.S. flag commercial vessels"  language.  This was strongly
emphasized during the Senate's debate of the bill  (Lawrence, 1966, 169-
170).
12requires that half of so-called "government impelled cargoes" be
transported on U.S. bottoms when such vessels are  "available"  subject  to  a
definition of availability by the program administrator.
An important component of cargo preference cargoes has been PL-480
grain.  As a result of the District Court Transportation Institute v. Dole
decision, which applied cargo preference to all subsidized export sales by
the USDA, including PL-480,  several amendments to the act were made in the
1985 Farm Bill.  Those  changes are that:
cargo preference requirements do not apply to specific
commercial agricultural export programs such as the export
credit, credit guarantee, blended credit, and export enhancement
programs.  However, in 1986 and 1987,  60 percent and 70 percent,
respectively, of food aid exports must be shipped on U.S.  flag
vessels.  In 1988  and thereafter, at least 75  percent must be
shipped on U.S. flag vessels.  The calendar years for complying
with these  requirements are the 12 month periods beginning April
1, 1986.  Through 1989,  the Secretary of Transportation must
ensure  that a specified amount of PL-480 title II  commodities is
shipped from Great Lakes ports.  The minimum tonnage of
agricultural commodities to be exported under programs subject to
the cargo preference requirements is  set by a formula but may be
waived by the President.
The Secretary of Transportation must finance any increased
ocean freight charges which result from specified changes to
cargo preference laws.  If ocean freight and differential costs
on commodities subject to  cargo preference requirement exceed 20
percent of the value of such commodities and such ocean freight
and differential costs, then the U.S. Department of
Transportation  (DOT) must pay the excess.  If the DOT lacks funds
for the increased costs,  then cargo preference requirements will
revert to previous law (Glaser, 1985,  44).
To  summarize, we have seen that PL-480 and cargo preference are
closely related programs.  They were considered and passed within six weeks
of each other during the 83rd Congress.  Since then, they have been
intimately linked, with PL-480 cargoes composing a large proportion of
preference cargoes.  This linkage has generated competition between the
beneficiaries of each program for program subsidies,  and in so  doing has
13harmed both groups.  American farmers have lost sales abroad directly
through cancellation of government export programs and indirectly through
the siphoning off of program funds  to pay transport costs.  Maritime
interests have been harmed by cargo preference because they have been given
little  incentive to  invest in modernized vessels that would be competitive
in world shipping markets.  Perversely, program incentives have led to
declining efficiency and competitiveness of the U.S.  fleet in world
shipping markets under a program that was supposed to make them more
competitive.  The nonfiscal nature of the aid provided by cargo preference
causes  greater distortion of market signals than would pure and direct
fiscal aid, perhaps characterized by direct monetary subsidy.
II.
CARGO PREFERENCE AND THE FOOD SECURITY ACT OF 1985
This section examines cargo preference and the Food Security Act of
1985  (1985 Farm Bill).  It is viewed in the framework of a bargaining
situation between agrarian and maritime interests.  There are aspects of
conflict, exemplified by the fight over the level of PL-480 cargo  to be
shipped on U.S. bottoms, and aspects of collaboration, exemplified by the
compromise struck to  exempt commercial USDA programs.  Mutual aversion to
further damage led to the final compromise.
The 1985 Farm Bill came  into being under the Reagan administration
environment of free market ideology and deficit reduction.  Its stated goal
was to  overturn 50 years of New Deal farm policy that provided large
subsidies  to  farmers  to ensure minimum income levels.  The Administration
14wanted instead to reduce price supports to induce more market-oriented
decision making among farmers  (Wehr, 2 March 85,  396).  The Congress,
divided between a Republican controlled Senate and Democratic controlled
House, found it hard to go along with this goal.  The House was for
continued price supports to maintain income, while the Senate wanted to
increase exports through various  export subsidy programs.  Against this
background, the issue of cargo preference was to play an important role.
Cargo preference was not originally an issue to be addressed during
the political wrangling over the extension of agricultural support programs
in 1985.  Instead, the farm bill was to be a vehicle  for "Reaganization" of
U.S.  farm policy entailing market orientation and reduction of government
involvement.  What happened, however, was quite different from what was
expected.  In this section we will examine  the circumstances that brought
cargo preference  to  the fore as an issue in the passage of the Food
Security Act of 1985.  To set the stage we will briefly look at  the
controversy over  the applicability of cargo preference to  agricultural
export promotion programs and its  temporary judicial solution.  We will
discuss the  interest groups and bureaucratic politics of cargo preference
in the Great Lakes, and the composition and goals of the agrarian and
maritime  interest groups.  While they clashed repeatedly to safeguard their
own well-entrenched interests,  a mutually acceptable compromise was
eventually found.
The Cargo  Preference Controversy
The  cargo preference controversy was based on differing
interpretations  of ambiguous administrative procedures and Congressional
intent for the PL-480 program.  Agrarian interests maintained an
15interpretation that was advantageous to  them, and maritime  interests did
the  same.  Here we will examine compliance with cargo preference
requirements by the USDA in its blended credit programs, using what we have
learned about its  legislative history.
Compliance with Cargo Preference
The Maritime Administration (MARAD) of the Department of
Transportation reviews government agency compliance in the administration
of cargo preference laws. 5 If an agency fails  to meet the  50 percent
requirement in a given year, MARAD may certify that failure was due  to
"non-availability of U.S. flag vessels."  However, if MARAD finds  a
violation of cargo preference laws because that agency has fallen below the
50 percent requirement when U.S. flag vessels were available, it can do
nothing.  MARAD has no enforcement mechanism available.  An example
follows.
USDA and USAID PL-480 cargoes are presented in Table 1.  As  shown,
USAID complied with cargo preference requirements for Titles I / III in
1982  and USDA for Title II  in 1980-1982.  MARAD certified
"non-availability" for Titles I / III in 1980 and 1981,  so USAID was in
compliance.  In 1983, however, neither program was found to be  in
compliance.  Lacking enforcement mechanisms, MARAD could do nothing to
ensure future compliance.
5The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 amended the Merchant Marine Act of
1936  to require each government agency to  administer its  programs  in
accordance with regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation.
16Table 1.  Revenue and Tonnage Derived from PL-480 Cargoes by U.S.  Flag
Vessels, 1980-1987.
Title I & III
U.S. Flag  Tonnage:
Revenue  U.S. Flag
Year  ($1,000)  Total  U.S. Flag  Percent
1980  119,842  3,544,373  1,452,217  41
1981  166,467  3,659,828  1,550,275  42
1982  172,387  3,915,939  2,036,581  52
1983  123,328  3,674,699  1,772,069  48  (b)
1984  141,642  4,507,224  2,296,547  51
1985  162,443  5,205,067  2,600,054  50
TQ (a)  42,789  1,059,067  525,135  49  (b)
1986  176,774  5,445,077  3,219,860  59
Title II
U.S. Flag  Tonnage:
Revenue  U.S.  Flag
Year  ($1,000)  Total  U.S. Flag  Percent
1980  127,797  1,595,504  861,404  54
1981  142,092  1,568,003  929,801  59
1982  120,311  1,660,464  908,186  55
1983  102,417  1,869,604  902,961  48  (b)
1984  118,864  2,011,132  1,177,378  58
1985  151,965  2,724,137  1,398,545  51
TQ  (a)  31,736  614,798  343,515  56
1986  112,354  1,670,668  1,085,959  65
Notes:
(a)1986 represented a change  from calendar year to  12 month period from
April 1 to March 31.  The  transition quarter (TQ) statistics for  the
period from January 1 to March 31,  1986 are presented, followed by those
for the fiscal year period from April 1, 1986  to March 31,  1987.
C(b)argo  preference requirements were not met for these periods.
Sources:  United States Department of Transportation, Maritime
Administration.  MARAD  '81 and subsequent years.
17USDA Blended Credit Programs and Cargo Preference
The blended credit program was announced in 1982 as an export credit
measure to increase depressed commodity prices (Jaroslovsky, 1982).  It
combined, or  "blended,"  two Government Services Manager (GSM) export credit
programs to provide competitive interest rates to foreign buyers of U.S.
agricultural commodities.  The  two programs, GSM-5  and GSM-102, are
administered by USDA.  The GSM-5 program "provides credit at market
interest rates  to importers of agricultural commodities.  For purposes of
the blended credit program, the credit  terms are at no  interest for a
period of up to  three years"  (Majority and Minority Staff, 1985,  65).  In
the GSM-102 program,  "the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) guarantees  the
obligations  of a foreign purchaser who buys U.S. agricultural commodities
on a deferred payment basis not exceeding three years.  In a typical
transaction, a U.S. exporter sells agricultural commodities  to  a foreign
buyer on a deferred payment basis.  The foreign buyer arranges  for a letter
of credit drawn on a foreign bank in favor of a U.S. bank willing to accept
deferred payment.  The U.S. bank pays  the exporter.  In the  interim, the
U.S. exporter registers the sale with the CCC and pays a guarantee fee.  If
the  sale arrangement is  approved, the  CCC guarantees the obligations of the
foreign bank to pay the U.S. bank for a period not exceeding three years"
(Majority and Minority Staff, 1985, 65-66).
In the blended credit transaction, CCC finances 20  percent of an
export sale of agricultural commodities at no interest under the GSM-5
program.  The foreign buyer obtains private financing for the remaining 80
percent of the purchase, and utilizing the GSM-102 program, the  CCC
guarantees  the obligations of the foreign entity  to pay.  The foreign buyer
18arranges  and pays for transportation of the commodities.  Overall, the
transaction results in the reduction of the effective  interest rate paid by
foreign purchasers of U.S. agricultural commodities  (Majority and Minority
Staff, 1985, 66).
Over the years USDA maintained that cargo preference did not apply to
GSM-5 or GSM-102.  Maritime interests raised no "serious objections"
(Majority and Minority Staff, 1985,  66).  Once the  two programs were
combined in the blended credit program, the maritime industry changed its
position, maintaining that the program should be subject to preference
requirements.  MARAD concurred, but, realizing that enforcement of
preference requirement would render the program inoperative for  several
reasons, chose not to enforce those requirements.
As a result, the Transportation Institute filed suit against Elizabeth
H. Dole, et al.,  in District of Columbia District Court  (No. 83-3048).  The
Transportation Institute and Plaintiff Interveners,  the Joint Maritime
Congress, sought to have the court declare  that the Preference Act was
applicable to the blended credit program, and that failure to comply was
unlawful.  On February 21,  1985,  the court found that the defendants
violated the Preference Act by failing to apply the Act  to  the blended
credit program.  The decision further stated that failure  to comply was
unlawful and beyond the scope of defendants' legal authority and,
therefore, was  "arbitrary,  capricious, and an abuse of discretion"
(Majority and Minority Staff, 1985,  66).  USDA suspended the program five
days later.
Since an important part of the Reagan Administration's,  soon to be
introduced, Farm Bill package was a series of export subsidies  to ease
19farmers through  the shock of support price reductions,  this ruling caused
some concern in the Administration.6 Farm state  legislators were outraged
at the District Court decision.  This confrontation set  the stage for the
fight and eventual compromise over cargo preference-and agricultural
exports  in the 1985 Farm Bill.
Interest Groups and the Bureaucratic Politics of Cargo Preference
Thomas Schelling  (1960) has argued that all "bargaining problems"
involve elements of both conflict and cooperation.  Conflict provides  the
motive force for change,  "the dramatic  interest,"  while collaboration
provides for stability.  In situations where common purposes outweigh
conflicting ones, society expects collaboration among opponents, whether
the society is  a corporate, Congressional, or general social entity.  Not
to do  so "carries  the pain of conspicuousness" and approbation (Schelling,
91,  1960).  The expectation that adversaries with common interests can
reach a mutually acceptable compromise can often be self-fulfilling, no
matter how "dramatic"  the conflict.
The key contending interest groups over cargo preference were agrarian
and maritime.  But these labels do not fit the interest groups exactly.
Due  to the nature of the conflict, there were also certain maritime groups
siding with the agrarian interests.  The agrarian interests, identified by
opposition to  the District Court ruling, included producers, USDA, USAID,
agribusiness,  exporters, shippers, processors, the Reagan Administration,
6David A. Stockman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
wrote to Senator John Danforth (R-MO) explaining the administration
position.  The  letter included draft legislation to  exempt GSM-5, GSM-102,
blended credit, and other commercial export sales made using the CCC to
reduce effective  commodity prices.  PL-480  sales were specifically not
included in the exemption (Stockman, 18 June 1985).
20and Great Lakes ports  and maritime interests.  The maritime  interests,
identified by support for the ruling, included MARAD, ship owners,  some
maritime unions, and Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coastal range ports.
Maritime interests, having been handed a resounding victory by the
judiciary, were not about to  return to  the former situation.  Agricultural
interests,  on the other hand, were determined to overturn a judicial
decision that would render competitive export programs uncompetitive and
would, in essence, act as an export tax to  support shipping interests.  The
interest groups presented here are those testifying before the House of
Representatives' Merchant Marine Subcommittee of the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries during legislative hearings on the Farm Bill.
The Congress.  In the House of Representatives, the Merchant Marine
Subcommittee of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries provides a
good representation of  the division of interests within the Congress.
Broadly speaking, this division was between farm state and maritime state
legislators.
The most vocal proponents of increased cargo preference requirements
were East Coast representatives.  Chairman Mario Biaggi's  (D-NY) district
included large dock areas in New York City, and he derived much of his
support from the  local unions.  Helen Delich Bentley (R-MD), a former
member and chair of the Federal Maritime Commission and a defender of cargo
preference, represented southern parts of the Port of Baltimore and the
area around Annapolis, and so had a very strong maritime and national
defense position.  Barbara Mikulski  (D-MD), who also represented part of
the Port of Baltimore, was concerned with the welfare of her port-dependent
constituents.  Less vocal was Norman Lent  (R-NY), who saw cargo preference
21as  an easy way to provide assistance to  the merchant marine.
Representing agrarian interests were Representatives from the Midwest.
James L. Oberstar (D-MN) was from a district with both agricultural and
maritime  interests, representing northeastern Minnesota and the Port of
Duluth.  He was a strong advocate of both agriculture and the maritime
industry.  Oberstar saw Great Lakes ports as  squeezed by circumstances
beyond their control.  Only one U.S.  flag company called regularly on the
Great Lakes,  so  opportunities to fulfill cargo preference requirements were
few.  He maintained that it was difficult to  convince other carriers  to
call  on the Lakes.  He had no qualms with the cargo preference program
itself;  rather, he was disappointed with the way the program was
administered.  Gerald D. Kleczka (D-WI) represented a district including
the Port of Milwaukee  that derived more than $16 million in wages for more
than 1,000 workers from shipping.  Title II  cargoes were crucial to
attracting ships  to the port.  He found, however, that  "subsidizing one set
of American workers  (maritime workers) at  the expense of another  (port
workers)  is unacceptable" (United States Congress, Hearings, 31 October
1985,  116).  Dennis A. Hertel  (D-MI) felt that the Great Lakes  did not
receive  the consideration that ought to be accorded a fourth sea coast,
particularly by the Administration.
Subcommittee members  Thomas M. Foglietta (D-PA) and Robert W. Davis
(R-MI) were noncommittal.  It  is  interesting to note that party affiliation
played no part in this  division of members of Congress, suggesting that
this was a regional rather than a partisan issue.
Now we will look at the  interest groups.
22Great Lakes Maritime Interests.  These were represented by three
groups--the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA)  of the AFL-CIO;
Meehan Seaway Service, a stevedore and terminal operator;  and the Great
Lakes Commission, a Great Lakes commerce advocacy group.
The ILA position as stated by Ray Sierra, was that U.S.  flag ships
avoided the Great Lakes, much to the detriment of union members,  and
despite the proximity to the home of production and processing of
industrial and agricultural commodities.  He maintained that "our fourth
seacoast is  fast becoming our forgotten seacoast"  (United States Congress,
Hearings, 31  October 1985,  132).  ILA proposals  included using fiscal year
accounting for preference cargoes and waiving the three year restriction on
foreign built reflagged vessels to  carry preference cargo.  The fiscal
year basis would allow more efficient allocation of Title  II cargoes,  and
the shortened restricted period after reflagging was thought  to have the
potential to increase Lakes  traffic.
The stevedore and terminal operators were represented by Tom Pfeil.
His company, the Meehan Seaway Service, opposed cargo preference because:
"It  does not take  into account  the realities  that have evolved [since  PL-
664 was adopted]"  (United States Congress, Hearings, 31 October 1985,  123).
He also  opposed changes  in USAID policy related to  lowest landed cost.7
Strong support for a lowest landed cost policy was evident among Great
7Lowest landed cost includes  three components--commodity cost,  inland
transportation to port of exit, and ocean transportation.  This  takes  PL-
480 cargoes from their places of origin to  the  docks of the  importing
countries.  The costs of transportation are  relatively competitive, and so
fairly fixed, but inland transportation costs vary widely depending on the
locations of production and exit.  USDA and USAID look to put 50  percent of
cargo on lowest  landed cost U.S. flag shipping, and then look to  lowest
landed cost for the other 50 percent as  a matter of policy.
23Lakes advocates, since the Lakes are closest to the areas of production.
Another common thread in testimony from many Great Lakes advocates,
mentioned by Pfeil, was the question of the meaning of "availability" in
the cargo preference laws.  There was  some debate over whether  it includes
intermodal and related forms of transportation (United States Congress,
Hearings, 31 October 1985,  123).
The Great Lakes  Commission held that cargo preference should be
"coastal range neutral,"  but because of the vagueness of the definition of
availability, it was seen to handicap the Great Lakes coast.  Commission
policy stated that cargo preference "was meant to support  the merchant
marine, not a specific set of ports"  (United States Congress, Hearings, 31
October 1985,  126).  Since cargo preference predates  the St. Lawrence
Seaway, there was no way for the Congress to have forecast its  negative
effects on the ports  of the Great Lakes.  The Commission also supported
the principle of lowest landed cost and a legislative definition of the
"availability"  language in the cargo preference laws  (United States
Congress, Hearings, 31 October 1985,  127-128).
Port Authorities of the Great Lakes.  These were represented by their
respective heads or their deputy heads.  The  consensus was support  for
cargo preference as  a concept, but not as  it was then implemented, and
certainly not as  Judge Green would have had it enforced.  There was  some
concern over cargo preference language, specifically about "fair and
reasonable participation by geographic area."  Title II  cargoes were the
life blood of the ports, even those  that did not actually handle  it,
because of the power of such cargo to  attract ships  to  the Lakes.  They
shared a desire for:  fiscal year accounting for cargo preference
24compliance, adherence to lowest landed cost, a clear definition of
availability of vessels, and an end to administrative diversion of cargoes
already contracted.  It was noted that competition from the Great Lakes
ports helped "keep the lid on costs" by forcing the three other coastal
areas  to compete, at least during the Lakes navigation season (United
States Congress, Hearings, 31 October 1985,  147-171).
The Reagan Administration preferred the  50 percent preference level  to
the increased requirements since it  adversely affected proposed farm
legislation.  The President also preferred an exemption for export
promotion cargoes  (Stockman, 18 June 1985).
The United States Department of Agriculture felt  that export
enhancement programs were not subject to  cargo preference, pointing to  the
opinion of Attorney General Robert Kennedy which exempted commercial
cargoes from cargo preference requirements  (Boren, 1985,  S3332).  The USDA
felt that since a similar program had been operated from 1949  to 1972
without being subject to  cargo preference, the blended credit program also
should not be subject to  it.  Finally, USDA wanted clarification of the
cargo preference status of GSM-5 and GSM-102 (United States Congress,
Hearings, 16 July 1985,  5-7).
United States Agency for  International Development  (USAID)  was opposed
to the expansion of cargo preference requirements on the grounds that:  "It
would be expensive to the taxpayer, limit program flexibility, and increase
the administrative burden for program implementation" (United States
Congress, Hearings, 5 December 1985,  198).
25Commodity Producer representatives were amenable  to  increased cargo
preference if commercial export programs were exempt.  They were concerned
that subsidies meant for food aid used instead to subsidize maritime
interests could mean "a 'life-or-death'  situation for needy and starving
people around the world" (United States Congress, Hearings, 5 December
1985,  237).
Agribusiness.  Shippers.  and Processors agreed that since higher costs
associated with cargo preference shipping reduced the amount of commodity
to be sold, and thus  the profit to be made, that cargo preference should
not be expanded (United States Congress, Hearings, 5 December 1985,
289-292).
Private Voluntary Organizations.  CARE, as  representative of U.S.
private voluntary organizations, was particularly concerned about the
higher cost of U.S. flag shipping which would otherwise be used to buy
food, and were  thus opposed to expanded preference requirements.  CARE
policy was  to look first to U.S. flag ships, but there were serious
problems since many such U.S. ships are below international standards.
CARE's  testimony included these complaints:
With specific respect to the application of these  standards
to food aid shipments and their compatibility with current  cargo
preference law, we have encountered serious constraints:
1.  In order to  comply with cargo preference, aging,
sub-standard vessels destined for salvage have been put into
service:  inappropriate tug and barge modalities have been used
on long haul voyages.
2.  Some U.S. ships,  inappropriately designed and outfitted
for the movement and evacuation of  food commodities, have been
put into use to  comply with cargo preference.
3.  Costs of U.S. liner service have to  increase sharply
vis-a-vis foreign vessels.
4.  The timing and scheduling of deliveries of food aid are
sometimes relegated to the need to meet cargo preference
requirements  (United States Congress, Hearings, 5 December 1985,
294).
26These interest groups, while seemingly dissimilar in goals, found a
common opposition to increasing cargo preference requirements sufficient to
bind them together into a cohesive bargaining unit.  It is  not common to
see entities as diverse  as CARE and Cargill on the same side of an issue.
Their common ground was based on potential economic losses  if the
Transportation Institute v. Dole decision was not reversed legislatively.
Maritime Interests
On the other side were groups that had a common support for the cargo
preference requirements.  If the new requirements were rolled back at all,
the group members would all  lose economically, and still be  in danger of
further cutbacks  in their subsidies.
The Maritime Administration. Department of Transportation (MARAD) is
charged with enforcing cargo preference.  MARAD also tries  to expand
opportunities for U.S.  flag shipping.  Thus MARAD supported expanded cargo
preference.
Tidewater Coast Ports.  These ports opposed any attempt to regulate
the ports  through which PL-480 cargo moved.  Any exception made for  the
Great Lakes ports would adversely affect the flow of PL-480 cargoes through
the  tidewater port ranges, resulting in a loss of port  income.  The Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey stated that  it opposed "any attempts
to shift cargo from Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts  to the Great Lakes
ports  through government regulations."  The South Atlantic and Caribbean
Ports Authority noted that  the Constitution prohibits favoring one port
over another, and opposed changes  in cargo preference that would favor  the
Great Lakes over any other range.  The California Association of Port
27Authorities stated that it "has  opposed and continues to oppose any
legislation that provides cargo preference which allocated cargo to a given
port or port region"  (United States Congress, Hearings, 31 October 1985,
177-182).
The Maritime Coalition is  composed of the Joint Maritime Congress,  the
Maritime Institute for Research and Industrial Development, the Seafarers
International Union, the Council of American-Flag Ship Operators,  and the
Transportation Institute.  The coalition, composed of labor and management
from tidewater ocean ports, was for expanded cargo preference because costs
were only a small portion of the  total bill for agricultural subsidies.
They saw nothing wrong with getting their piece of the pie from funding
devoted to agriculture.  In reality, they were only trying to  defend what
they thought they had gained from the Transportation Institute v. Dole
ruling (United States Congress, Hearings, 5 December 1985,  266-289).
The Exporters.  Represented by the North American Export Grain
Association, exporters were against expanding cargo preference, but they
were also against the status quo.  Since they shipped about 90  percent of
U.S. grain exports,  they were in a good position to know the state of the
maritime  industry.  They found only 45 vessels available  to handle PL-480
cargoes, many of which were ill-equipped.  The Association was also against
the compromise on cargo preference because they found  it weak.  There were
no mechanisms by which the U.S. fleet would improve efficiency or expand
availability, and no impetus  for developing the U.S. merchant marine
industry into a viable, competitive  fleet  (United States Congress,
Hearings, 5 December 1985,  289-290).
28The 1985 Farm Bill and Cargo Preference
The culmination of the struggle over cargo preference took place
during the fight over the 1985 Farm Bill.  Each group, agrarian and
maritime, pleaded its case before Congress.  Members of the House and
Senate, themselves unable to find a suitable solution, had the  interest
groups hammer out  their own compromise to be incorporated in the farm
legislation package.  This  is what happened.
The Reagan Administration's  draft farm bill was  introduced by request
in the Senate by Jesse Helms  (R-NC), chair of the Agriculture  Committee and
in the House, also by request, by Edward R. Madigan (R-IL),  ranking
minority member of the Agriculture Committee  (Wehr, 2 March 85,  397).8
Since virtually all agricultural cargoes financed by the government,
whether on commercial or concessional terms, were now considered subject to
cargo preference, a key part of the Reagan Administration's  farm
legislation package was  in jeopardy.  The price advantage of subsidized
commercial agricultural exports would be removed in the judicial climate.
The administration and farm state legislators were forced to develop a
legislative remedy.  Various proposals were introduced, all of which
eventually failed in the  face of the powerful maritime lobby.  They are
shown in Table 2.  From this flurry of proposals beginning in March,9 the
maritime interests knew that the gains handed to them by Judge Green in
February would not be kept without a fight from agrarian interests.
8Introduction "by request"  of a piece of legislation means  that the
bill sponsor does not support the administration measure.
9Except for the Inouye proposal, which was made  in January.
29Table 2.  Sponsor and Anti-Cargo Preference Legislation Introduced during
the Debate on the 1985 Farm Bill.
* HR 1464 (C. Evans)  To prohibit use of CCC  funds  to finance ocean
freight differential required for cargo preference compliance.
Department of Defense liable for increased charges.
* HR 1465  (C. Evans)  To prohibit use of CCC  funds to finance ocean freight
differential required for cargo preference compliance.  MARAD liable
for increased charges.
* HR 1466  (C. Evans)  To exempt blended credit program from cargo
preference requirements.
*  HR 1517  (V. Smith)  To prohibit application of cargo preference to CCC or
USDA export expansion programs.
* HR 1617  (English)  To amend CCC charter to exempt export promotion
activities of CCC and USDA from certain cargo preference requirements.
* HR 1760  (Bereuter)/  S 930  (Nickles)  To exempt all agricultural export
programs, including PL-480,  from cargo preference.
* HR 1965  (Emerson)/ S 908  (McConnell)  To exempt PL-480  and CCC financed
export credit programs from cargo preference.
* HR 2357  (H.  Brown)  To  exempt all government assisted agricultural export
programs, including PL-480,  from cargo preference.
*  HR 2538  (Leach)  To exempt all agricultural export and foreign assistance
programs from cargo preference.
* S 187  (Inouye)  To grant the Secretary of Transportation sole
responsibility for determining and designating programs subject to
cargo preference.
* S 616  (Helms)  A provision would exempt export PIK and blended credit
programs and emergency food aid from cargo preference.
* S 664  (Nickles)  To prohibit application of cargo preference to  CCC or
USDA export expansion programs.
* S 721  (Boren)  To  amend the CCC Act to provide that agricultural exports,
except PL-480,  not be subject to cargo preference.
Source:  United States Congress, House of Representatives,  Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries,  Subcommittee on Merchant Marine.
Maritime/Agriculture Cargo Preference Compromise and Great Lakes Cargo
Preference.  Hearings before the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine.  99
Congress, 1st session, 5 Dec 1985.  (Washington, DC:  United States
Government Printing Office, 1986).  Pp.  328-330.
30At the end of March, the maritime interests had cargo preference
required on 50 percent of blended credit export cargoes as  well as  on
PL-480.  But, farm state senators and representatives launched an onslaught
of legislation to take back the lost ground.  Proposals ranged from fairly
reasonable, like S 616 and S 664 to outrightly belligerent, like HR 1760 /
S 930  (see Table 2).
At the same time, Senators Pressler, Boschwitz, and Boren prepared to
introduce a bill to  limit cargo preference requirements  to PL-480 and USAID
programs to which they had been historically applied.  Senator Pressler
noted in preparatory remarks that:
the  15  to  30 percent increase in shipping costs will more
than negate the  two percent interest reduction under the Blended
Credit Program.  If the current ruling stands,  the government
will either have to provide additional funds to pay for shipping
the grain or  the export sales will not be made.  With the huge
federal deficit problem we face today, we cannot afford to
provide such additional funds.  Yet our record trade deficit and
depressed farm economy desperately require those exports.  It  is
clear that we need to limit the costly cargo preference provision
to the Public Law 480 program and AID export sales  (Pressler,
Congressional Record, 18 March 1985, S3010).
On May 14,  the Senate Agriculture Committee reported favorably on
S 721.  Senator Dole and seven other senators urged that  it be passed in
response to the District Court ruling of February 21.  But on June 19,  the
Senate Commerce Committee voted 9-7  to  report unfavorably on S 721.  David
Stockman, director of OMB, said the administration would accept an
exemption for commercial  farm exports.  Dole, unsure of the outcome of what
would have been a difficult  floor fight, withheld the legislation from the
Senate floor.
In September in the House, the Rules Committee  included a provision
from the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee requiring application of
31cargo preference to government generated farm export programs.  At the same
time, several Agriculture Committee members planned "to introduce an
amendment exempting virtually all government sponsored export programs from
cargo preference requirements"  (Rapp, 21 September 1985,  1895).
On October 3 in the House, maritime interests prevailed handily over
farm interests in amendments to  the Farm Bill.  The first of two measures
defeated would have exempted all agricultural exports, including PL-480,
from cargo preference requirements.  Introduced by Glenn English  (D-OK), it
failed 179-245 and was subsequently defeated by voice vote.  The second
measure, that would have required MARAD to  pay for cargo preference subsidy
costs for agricultural export programs, was rejected even more
resoundingly, 151-269  (Rapp, 5 October 1985,  1971 and 2028).
Finally, on October 8, the House passed HR 2100, its farm bill, by
282-141 (Rapp, 12 October 1985,  2055).  Cargo preference provisions of the
bill were that:
government sponsored financing programs  for agricultural
export sales, except certain Food for Peace programs and other
grant programs specifically exempted by law (PL 95-501),  must
abide by cargo preference requirements that half of specified
cargoes must be shipped on U.S.  flag vessels.  Exemptions would
not be allowed for new activity resulting directly from the
expansion of the intermediate export credit program (Provisions
of the House-passed...,  12  October 1985,  2059).
The  Senate floor debate on its version of the farm bill began
October 25  (Senate opens debate...,  26 October 1985,  2184).  After the
House rejection of the English amendment, Senator Thad Cochran (R-MS)
"renegotiated a previous  agreement between farm and maritime groups that
would exempt all government generated commercial sales,  such as  those in
the blended credit program;  but in exchange, U.S. merchant marine
companies" would get cargo preference  requirements on PL-480 and related
32programs expanded to  75  percent.  The Department of Transportation was  to
pay the excess cost of the expanded requirements.  Tentative approval was
granted October 29 by a vote of 70-30 on amendments by Cochran, Ted Stevens
(R-AK), and Daniel Inouye  (D-HI), but Senators Alan J. Dixon  (D-IL), Rudy
Boschwitz  (R-MN), and other midwestern senators were enraged because they
realized the plan would further limit shipping opportunities out of Great
Lakes ports.  They launched a fusillade of six amendments  to protect Lakes
shipping interests and market share, but were soundly defeated on all.
However, Dixon and Boschwitz  "forced a compromise encouraging the
government to maintain the level of export traffic  in Great Lakes ports
that PL-480 shipments generated in 1984"  (Rapp, 2 November 1985,  2195).
Stevens and Inouye agreed to  this compromise and it was approved by the
full Senate 53-43.  The Senate passed its farm bill on November 23  (Rapp,
30 November 1985,  2513).
There was some difference between the House and Senate  cargo
preference provisions.  The Joint Maritime Congress had announced its
support for the Senate compromise on November 25  (Rapp, 30 November 1985,
2514).  The bill taken to conference, which began on 5 December 1985,
however, was the House bill.  By December 13,  no compromise had been
reached on the cargo preference provisions.  There was disagreement among
House conferees on adopting the Senate language, particularly two with
agricultural interests--Glenn English (D-OK) and Doug Bereuter  (R-NE)
(Rapp, 14 December 1985,  2657).  The problems were eventually solved,
however, and both houses passed the bill, the Food Security Act of 1985,  on
December 18  (Rapp, 21 December 1985,  2673).  A summary of  the cargo
preference compromise follows:
33Cargo preference requirements do not apply to specific
commercial agricultural export programs such as  the export
credit, credit guarantee, blended credit, and export enhancement
programs.  However, in 1986 and 1987,  60  percent and 70 percent,
respectively, of food aid exports must be shipped on U.S.  flag
vessels.  In 1988 and thereafter, at least 75 percent must be
shipped on U.S. flag vessels.  The calendar years for complying
with these requirements are the 12-month periods beginning
April 1, 1986.  Through 1989,  the Secretary of Transportation
must ensure  that a specified amount of PL-480 Title  II
commodities  is  shipped from Great Lakes ports.  The minimum
tonnage of agricultural commodities to be exported under
programs subject to the cargo preference requirements  is set by a
formula but may be waived by the President.
The Secretary of Transportation must finance any increased
ocean freight charges which result from specified changes to
cargo preference laws.  If ocean freight and ocean freight
differential costs on commodities subject to cargo preference
requirement exceed 20 percent of the value of such commodities
and such ocean freight and differential costs,  then the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT) must pay the excess.  If the
DOT lacks funds for the  increased costs, then cargo preference
requirements will revert to previous law (Glaser, 1985,  44).
It was this  compromise which became part of the law.  As is  common in
bargaining situations, the common interests of the opposing agrarian and
maritime groups  finally outweighed and overcame  the conflicts.  While the
compromise was politically and economically feasible, we question its
economic efficiency.
PL-480 AND CARGO PREFERENCE IN DULUTH:  ECONOMIC EFFECTS
Duluth has  several important natural advantages as a port.  It is  the
most westerly American port with an outlet at the Atlantic Ocean.  It is
close to the centers of production of American industry and agriculture.
It is  centrally located and has easy access to  inland rail and river
transportation.  It also has  two major drawbacks.  The  first is  the  limited
navigation season.  The port is only operational eight or nine months out
of the year.  The other is  the fragility of its  link to  the Atlantic.  The
34St. Lawrence Seaway has exhibited an alarming tendency to break down recently,
causing the loss of valuable time and money while ships sit  idly waiting for
Seaway repairs.  For this reason, and several others, only one U.S. flag
steamship  company -- Lykes Brothers of New Orleans  -- provides regular service
to  the Great Lakes.
The PL-480 program is of great  importance to the Port of Duluth.
According to  Davis Helberg, Director of the Seaway Port Authority of Duluth:
"Approximately 85 percent of annual general cargo exports and more  than 50
percent of our longshoremen's man-hours are directly attributable to PL-480,
Title II.  In given years, the level of PL-480, Title II,  cargo has approached
95  percent of all the port's general cargo exports"  (United States Congress,
Hearings, 31 October 1985,  160).
Government cargoes have a great effect on the economic well being of
Great Lakes ports, and Duluth in particular.  According to a 1985 report by
the Center for  the Great Lakes, increased shipping of government cargoes
through  the Great Lakes would have significant effects on increasing income
and employment in the region.10 Of government programs, the most important is
PL-480 Title II.  This may be seen in Table 3, which details  PL-480 Title II
shipments by port of exit and longshoremen hours worked.  The hypothesis of
stevedore employment matching PL-480 Title II exports  fits available data
fairly well.  This  is particularly true in Duluth.  Milwaukee and Chicago are
larger ports with a more diverse cargo base, so they may not be as dependent as
Duluth is  on PL-480 for stevedoring work.11 Thus we see that PL-480 Title II
10 See the Appendix for the quantitative results of this  study.
11The  time series is  relatively short, so  these results should be
taken as  tentative.
35provides employment both directly and indirectly, and it generates more  income
as  the volume of cargo  increases.
What are  the effects  of cargo preference, specifically the expanded
PL-480 Title II requirements?  Increased cargo preference requirements with
virtually no U.S. flag vessels available means Duluth is competing for only
that  25 percent of cargoes eligible  to be carried on foreign flag vessels.  In
the past, Duluth was competing for at least the  50 percent allowed to be
hauled on such ships.  To compensate  for this,  the cargo preference compromise
in the 1985 Farm Bill provided for a minimum guarantee of about 250,000 tons  of
PL-480 Title II  cargo for the Great Lakes from 1986  to 1989.  However,
according to Davis Helberg  (personal communication, May 22,  1989),  about
100,000 tons of that cargo  is  loaded on barges  in Chicago and shipped down the
Mississippi River to New Orleans and other Gulf Coast ports.  That leaves  only
about 150,000  tons of this cargo for the other Lake ports, which is  far below
historical levels  (see Table 4).
To examine the effects of the cargo preference compromise, Hanson  (1987)
applied a model by Paarlberg used to predict the effects of cargo preference.
Details are found in the Appendix.
Hanson concluded that, given the limitations of his model, a higher
preference requirement would result in  "a small shift from PL-480  sales and
donations to commercial sales."  This is not likely to be a welcome  conclusion
at Duluth, since it  is  less  competitive handling commercial shipments.1 2
Thus,  the major effects of increased cargo preference on Duluth are
twofold.  The port loses cargo because more PL-480 grain must be  shipped on
U.S.  flag vessels that do not often call at Duluth.  Then, since  the port gets
less  labor intensive cargo, longshoremen lose wages.  These lost wages echo
through the local economy, causing further economic injury.
1 Scott Hanson, unpublished manuscript, 1987.
36Table 3.  PL-480 Title II  Tonnage by Port of Exit and Longshoremen's Hours Worked,
1979-1984.
Year  Duluth  Milwauke  Chicago
PL-480  PL-480  PL-480
Title II  Longshoremen  Title II  Longshoremen  Title II  Longshoremen
Tonnage  Hours Worked  Tonnage  Hours Worked  Tonnage  Hours Worked
1979  25,647  55,222  27,953
1980  17,107  72,065  30,082
1981  38,829  102,942  82,595  116,798  46,104  269,006
1982  38,984  96,883  121,333  142,530  52,432  255,602
1983  25,335  82,943  161,076  186,641  27,051  229,655
1984  26,652  86,900  143,402  216,549  6,388  240,345
Source:  Moving Government Goods on the Great Lakes.  What an Increase Would Mean
in Dollars  and Jobs for the Region.  A Report from the Center for the Great Lakes.
Chicago, November 1985.  pp. 28,  43.
Table 4.  Historical Levels of PL-480 Title II  Cargo Shipped from Selected Port
Ranges and Ports, 1978-1986  (in tons).
Year  Coastal Range  Port Customs District
Atlantic  Gulf  Pacific  Lakes  Duluth  Milwaukee  Chicago
1978  41,594  718,380  343,395  147,628  26,914  78,887  41,827
1979  33,978  633,124  372,306  205,711  34,298  112,282  59,132
1980  65,372  713,854  272,170  180,117  18,852  111,265  50,000
1981  150,164  612,584  229,827  270,373  46,790  143,527  75,157
1982  198,033  575,359  133,187  332,507  56,060  203,561  66,137
1983  170,530  914,681  95,856  355,966  31,584  250,045  61,078
1984  189,951  1,131,673  118,257  277,579  36,461  209,150  30,717
1985  257,235  1,436,666  252,571  321,446  30,257  269,540  21,650
1986  172,913  1,072,125  170,503  264,112  103,138  144,502  16,472
Mean  138,357  842,040  227,196  261,416  35,152  172,282  50,712
Notes:  Atlantic total  is  the  aggregate of north and south Atlantic totals.  Gulf
totals include inland cargoes.
Source:  Scott Hanson, unpublished manuscript, 1987.
37SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this report we have examined the changing relation between the Food
for Peace program and the Cargo Preference program and some possible
effects of those changes on the Port of Duluth.  We have seen how disparate
political interests joined to reach an acceptable compromise over a
divisive issue.  We conclude with some comments on this  "competition for
subsidy."  When a program produces  friction between groups with some common
interests,  the conflict wastes competitive energy, just as physical
friction wastes energy as heat.  To  remove some of the friction between
interest groups with common ground, we propose an economically attractive,
yet politically feasible alternative.
The  1985 Farm Bill increased cargo preference requirements for cargoes
vital to  the economic health of the Port of Duluth-Superior and the Great
Lakes as  a whole.  As  a concession, the Lakes ports were given a special
temporary cargo allotment.  The extension of that cargo allotment is  now
the subject of negotiation.  This points  to  a basic weakness  in cargo
preference programs;  they are claimed to be coast range neutral, but in
fact, they are not.  Perhaps range neutrality is  not a desirable goal.  It
is possible cargo preference does not disadvantage U.S.  ports overall, just
Great Lakes ports.  It may be the aggregate effect of cargo preference on
U.S. ports  is positive, and Great Lakes ports are simply not competitive.
How can range neutrality be introduced to  the preference cargo
allocation process?  Many suggestions were made by interest groups
testifying before Congress during the debates on cargo preference and the
1985 Farm Bill.  Most were satisfied with one form or another  of the status
quo.  Some proposed some modifications here and there, but the  guts of the
38program were almost never challenged.  That would be fine if the cargo
preference program had given us a modern, secure, competitive fleet.  It
has not.
Cargo preference legislation stated that in the event of a national
emergency, the merchant marine should be capable of supporting military
action through logistical support.  This has not been achieved.  Had cargo
preference achieved this goal, there would be no need for the U.S. Navy to
maintain its own Rapid Reserve Force of support merchant ships.  Yet, since
the technological needs of naval sealift are  generally different than  those
of bulk cargo transport, we have a merchant marine that is,  for the most
part, unsuited to  the supporting role  it  is supposed to play.  Instead, the
government has subsidized a fleet that is unable to  fulfill  its  obligation
for receiving that subsidy.
In CARE's  testimony before Congress, merchant marine vessels  that haul
PL-480 cargoes were described as old ships that do not meet world shipping
standards.  This  is not a fleet "composed of the best equipped, safest, and
most suitable types of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned
with a trained and efficient citizen personnel" that  is mandated in the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936.  Further, the  increase  in preference cargo
levels  from 50 percent to  75 percent is  likely to bring even less suitable
vessels out of mothballs and into the trades.  Something is very wrong with
this program.
There are many alternatives.  One  is doing nothing.  The status quo
has the advantage that it  is already in place.  One extreme measure  is  to
remove all subsidies and allow the fleet  to compete  in the world market.
This would be an almost certain death knell of the merchant fleet.  While
39having a certain economic attraction, it  is not politically feasible.  The
strong constituencies of maritime subsidies would not allow it.  Another
radical measure is  to nationalize the fleet.  Rather than have the
government pay for shipping  indirectly, allow the government to pay the
entire cost of shipping directly.  This would eliminate distortions
embodied in nonfiscal aid and reduce transaction costs in fiscal aid
programs.  This is  also not politically feasible.
These, naturally, are three unacceptable courses.  A more reasonable
solution is  for the government to subsidize the merchant marine directly,
rather than take the subsidy out of funds meant to  support agricultural
programs.  Let the maritime industry have its  subsidies in the budget
explicitly rather than piggy-backing on agriculture's funding.  As
Representative Kleczka of Milwaukee said, "Subsidizing one set of American
workers at  the expense of another is unacceptable."
The bureaucratic morass of this  interdepartmental program is  so well
entrenched that  it  is virtually impossible to change  it due  to  institutional
inertia.  The administration of PL-480 and cargo preference makes it nearly
impossible for American farmers and carriers to  respond in a timely fashion
to market opportunities abroad.  And when they try, there  is friction.
These two industries, both facing hard times, need to cooperate.  How might
that be accomplished?  A first step would be to  remove sources of
competition for the  same funding.  It  is  this competition for subsidy,
rather than competition for markets, which harms both parties.  The
solution may be to  disqualify one of the groups from eligibility and give
it its own subsidy program.  Then both parties would be able to do their
respective jobs  instead of protecting their subsidy from each other.
40A reasonable compromise proposal was made in the House Merchant Marine
Subcommittee hearings of December 5, 1985 by Myron Laserson of the National
Agricultural  Export Grain Association.  It bears repeating:
The  [cargo preference]  compromise proposal has no mechanism
by which the U.S.  flag fleet will improve efficiencies or  expand
availability and no  impetus  for developing the U.S. merchant
marine industry into a viable, competitive fleet.
The maritime subsidy needs to be redesigned to promote a
safe and efficient fleet.  The new program should be based on
incentives and competitiveness and should not sap the  funding
from the U.S. agricultural export program.
The U.S. agricultural sector will sell less commodities
under the Public Law 480 and section 416 programs because
inflated freight rates will absorb more of that funding under the
50 percent cargo preference paid by USDA.  Those programs
exempted under the compromise, the commercial export programs,
will be held hostage subject to  the full appropriation of funding
to MarAd to  cover the additional 25 percent.
In other words, agriculture will lose tonnage under the
concessional programs and only gain uncertainty  in the commercial
export programs.
... We recommend the  issue be thoroughly examined and
studied, leading toward a new comprehensive maritime  subsidy
policy which will foster growth and development in both the
maritime industry and U.S.  agriculture  (United States Congress,
Hearings, 5 December 1985,  289-290).
The United States needs to  find an efficient, market oriented system
to support the redevelopment of a modern, safe merchant  fleet.  Repealing
the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 would be a start.  In its place, a direct
subsidy program similar to or an extension of the existing Operating
Differential Subsidy program administered within the Department of
Transportation's Maritime Administration would be more economically
efficient, allow more flexibility in response to market conditions by
maritime interests, and promote cooperation rather than competition between
the natural allies  -- farmers and shippers.  It will not be easy, and it
certainly will not be popular, but it needs  to be done  for the  sake of the
American fleet and of American competitiveness  in world trade.
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46APPENDIX
This appendix presents the quantitative results of two studies
relevant to  the debate over cargo preference and the Great Lakes.  The
quantitative results should be viewed with some skepticism, but the
qualitative results and policy recommendations are substantially reliable.
The first study is by the Center for the Great Lakes, a Great Lakes
advocacy group. 13 The report is based on an econometric model of cargo
flow through Great Lakes port.  The germane part of the model predicts the
levels of income and employment generated both directly and indirectly by
increased government cargo shipments through the Great Lakes.  Those
results  are presented in Table A-1.
According to the model, about 110 jobs and $2.7  million in income are
created directly, and between 250 and 375 jobs and about $8 million in
income are created indirectly for each five percent share  increase of
government cargo shipments flowing through Great Lakes ports.
Qualitatively it says that there are significant positive effects on Great
Lakes ports from increased flow of government cargoes.
The second study is an unpublished report by Scott Hanson of the
University of Minnesota.14 He altered Paarlberg's differentiated products
model  to analyze the effects of changing cargo preference requirements on
U.S. wheat exports.  Using the world wheat market as a model of all markets
of PL-480 agricultural commodities, Paarlberg's model was found useful for
13Moving Government Goods on the Great Lakes.  What an Increase Would
Mean in Dollars and Jobs for  the Region.  A report from the Center for the
Great Lakes.  Chicago, November, 1985.
14 Scott Hanson.  Unpublished Manuscript.  1987.
47predicting the effects of increased cargo preference requirements for PL-
480.
Paarlberg, using data from 1977  to 1981, found the effect on the world
wheat market of an increase of cargo preference requirements from 50
percent to 100 percent.  Hanson found it possible to modify the model to
accommodate the  increase in cargo preference requirements to 75 percent for
PL-480 shipments.  Hanson extrapolated the Paarlberg results  to predict the
effect of the cargo preference compromise  increase from 50 percent to  75
percent.15 The  results of the simulation are  shown in Table A-2.
Paarlberg found that higher preference requirements brought about a
shift from concessional to  commercial sales.  During Paarlberg's study
period, commercial sales accounted for 90 percent of the market and
concessional sales for ten percent.  The net effect was to  increase
exports.  According to Hanson's modified model, at the  75  percent
preference level,  concessional sales would fall 2.72 percent, or about
100,000 tons while commercial  sales would rise  2.37 percent, or about
750,000 tons.  Prices at home and abroad would increase.
Hanson noted three problems with the model.  First, the model refers
to concessional sales, not the donations with which we are most concerned.
This may be explained by assuming that donations are sales where the
concession is  equal to the market price.  Paarlberg included donations  in
the definition of concessional sales, but it  is  difficult to  conclude that
subsidized sales and donations will change proportionally with changes  in
cargo preference requirements.  Second, the allocation of donations under
15Hanson suggested that this  is possible because the model is  linear
with only one variable parameter.
48Title II  is made partly for political reasons, which may be wholly
uneconomic.  Hanson felt it would be better not to  model this.  Third,
Congress  sets Title II  donation levels.  Hanson noted there  is no
neo-classical market for these donations, as was assumed in the model.  He
further stated that Title II  shipments had never reached Congressionally
mandated levels, and that market forces played a role  in the commodity and
shipping costs.  USDA's program budget is  fixed, so it may only donate as
much food as the budget allows, no matter what the program volume goals
are.
Changes predicted by Paarlberg's model include a fall in concessional
sales of 2.72 percent  (about 100,000 tons) with a concurrent increase in
commercial sales of 2.37 percent  (about 750,000 tons).  The decrease in
concessional sales, or of Title II donations, would hit hard at employment
and income in Duluth.  Crudely, this would mean the direct loss of between
2,400 and 3,100 hours of longshoremen's labor.16 This does not consider
possible increases in exports due to  the increase in commercial sales.
16This  is based on the following assumptions:  that  the mean level of
PL-480 Title  II  cargoes of 35,152  tons per year would be reduced by 2.72
percent from Table 4 above, and that the mean hours of labor generated per
ton of PL-480 Title II cargo  is between 2.5  and 3.2, based on historical
labor and PL-480  tonnage patterns in Duluth.
49Table A-1.  Direct and Indirect Employment and Income Creation by Increased
Great Lakes Share of Overseas Government Cargo.
Share  Jobs  Direct  Total Direct and Indirect
Increase  Created  Income  Jobs  Income
(%)  ($mn)  Created  ($mn)
10  222  5.2  511  16.0
25  552  13.6  1,342  28.2
50  1,102  27.2  3,779  83.5
100  2,199  54.0  7,545  166.0
Source:  Moving Government Goods on the Great Lakes.  What an Increase
Would Mean in Dollars and Jobs for the Region.  A Report from the Center
for the Great Lakes.  Chicago, November 1985.  P. 15.
Table A-2.  Changes Caused by Increased Cargo Preference Requirements from
50 Percent Cargo Preference on U.S. Wheat Export Prices and
Quantities  (in percent).
Change  to:  100 percent  75 percent




Commercial  2.22  1.11
Concessional  11.94  5.97
U.S. Domestic Price  2.81  1.90
Quantities
Commercial  4.74  2.37
Concessional  -5.44  -2.72
Source:  Scott Hanson, unpublished manuscript, 1987.
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